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Abstract 
 
 
We examine how the regulatory burdens to being public affect the investment and innovation of newly 
public firms. To do so, we exploit the Jumpstart our Business Start-up (JOBS) Act, which eliminates certain 
disclosure, auditing, and governance requirements for a subset of newly public firms. Firms treated with 
these reduced burdens invest more and more efficiently after going public relative to untreated firms. These 
findings are concentrated in innovative investments, are accompanied by treated firms being less prone to 
cater to short-term earnings benchmarks, and are non-existent in dual class firms. We conclude that one 
reason the burdens to being public affect investment and innovation is because they divert resources away 
from long-run value increasing investments.  
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1.  Introduction 
Congress passed the Jumpstart our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act) to stimulate small 
firm capital raising and growth. To facilitate this objective, the initial public offering (IPO) Task Force 
surveyed CEOs whose firms recently went public on the most significant challenges to an IPO. The top two 
challenges reported were (1) the administrative burdens of public reporting and (2) the accompanying 
reallocation of the CEO’s time to reporting and compliance rather than company building (IPO Task Force, 
2011). The JOBS Act seeks to mitigate these challenges with de-burdening provisions that reduce required 
financial statement and executive disclosure in the IPO prospectus and in annual reporting, and exempt 
issuers from auditor attestations to internal controls as well as shareholder say-on-executive pay votes.1 The 
intent of these de-burdening provisions is to allow new issuers to “secure capital to grow their business and 
let managers pursue promising new products and innovations” (IPO Task Force, 2011).  
There are two ways that the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions may achieve this goal. The first 
is via increased IPO volume. Although the idea that de-burdening the public markets will increase IPO 
volume is intuitive, it is not well supported in the literature. Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013) and Doidge, 
Karolyi, and Stulz (2017) both find that the increased burdens to being public introduced with the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) had little effect on IPO volume. Dambra, Field, and Gustafson (2015) corroborate this 
evidence surrounding the passage of the JOBS Act, concluding that the de-burdening provisions are an 
unlikely driver of IPO activity.  
The second way that the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions may facilitate investment and 
innovation is by allowing the firms that do go public to invest and innovate more. Although there is a large 
literature examining how the burdens introduced by SOX affect investment, evidence is mixed, in part 
because of contemporaneous changes in regulation and market conditions.2 Moreover, the extent to which 
                                                          
1 All of these provisions remain in effect for up to five years after a firm’s IPO. 
2 See, for example, Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter (2010), Kang, Liu, and Qi (2010), Albuquerque and Zhu (2018), Coates 
and Srinivasan (2014), Gao and Zhang (2018), Hanley (2017), and Leuz and Wysocki (2016). 
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this literature can be extended to newly public firms, such as those targeted by the JOBS Act, is unclear.   
In this paper we introduce a policy experiment to provide evidence on whether the JOBS Act’s de-
burdening provisions affect post-IPO investment and innovation. An appealing feature of our empirical 
setting is that the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions affect only a subset of IPO issuers. Specifically, the 
JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions only affect firms with $75 million or more in public float (i.e., Non-
Smaller Reporting Companies, Non-SRCs) because firms below this threshold (i.e., Smaller Reporting 
Company eligible firms, SRCs) have benefitted from the de-burdening provisions since February of 2008, 
approximately four years before the passage of the JOBS Act.3,4 This allows us to use SRCs as a control 
group in a quasi-difference-in-differences framework, similar to that used by Chaplinsky, Hanley, and 
Moon (2017). This framework isolates the effect of the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions because 
although SRCs do not benefit from the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions, they do benefit from all other 
aspects of the JOBS Act, such as the ability to pre-market IPO shares and to confidentially file initial IPO 
prospectuses. Thus, by comparing the post-IPO investment of SRCs and non-SRCs before and after the 
enactment of the JOBS Act, we can both separate the effect of the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions 
from its other provisions and include time fixed effects to control for changes in the economic conditions 
before and after the JOBS Act.  
We corroborate existing evidence that the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions do not significantly 
affect the type of firms going public.5 There is no change in either the fraction of IPO issuers that are Non-
SRCs or the relative characteristics of SRC and Non-SRC IPO issuers following the passage of the JOBS 
Act. Neither SRC nor non-SRC issuers significantly change in size (i.e., total assets, IPO proceeds, or 
                                                          
3 Except for the “Say-on-Pay” provisions, which were legislated in 2010 and effective in 2011 for Non-SRCs. SRCs 
were exempt from “Say-on-Pay” prior to the passage of the JOBS Act. 
4 The approximately 13% of IPO issuers with over $1 billion in pre-IPO revenue are not affected by the JOBS Act 
provisions and are excluded from our analysis.  
5 Both Dambra, Field, and Gustafson (2015) and Cheng (2015) find that the pre-IPO marketing and confidential filing 
provisions (i.e., the “pre-IPO” provisions) result in a different type of firm going public after the passage of the JOBS 
Act. In contrast, neither study finds that the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions affect the composition of firms going 
public. 
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revenues) or the probability of venture or private equity backing following the passage of the JOBS Act. 
Although there is some change in the industry composition of the firms going public following the JOBS 
Act, these changes do not significantly differ based on SRC status. Thus, we can plausibly identify the 
effect of the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions on corporate investment by comparing the differential 
post-IPO investment of SRCs and Non-SRCs before and after the passage of the JOBS Act.  
We find robust evidence that Non-SRC firms going public after the passage of the JOBS Act invest 
more in the years following their IPO than Non-SRCs going public earlier. Difference-in-differences 
estimates and parallel trend analyses indicate that this investment increase is unique to Non-SRCs and 
occurs discontinuously after the passage of the JOBS Act (i.e., there is no trend in the relative investment 
of SRCs and non-SRCs before Congress passes the JOBS Act). Relative to SRCs, Non-SRC firms increase 
average quarterly investment by approximately 0.5 standard deviations after the passage of the JOBS Act. 
The magnitude and statistical significance of this estimate are qualitatively similar and statistically 
significant during each of the first four quarters a firm is public.6 In addition, results are similar using a 
propensity score matched (PSM) sample in which Non-SRC and control firms are observably similar pre- 
and post-JOBS Act, restricting the sample to firms with below $150 million in public float, or conducting 
a within-firm analysis in which the dependent variable is a firm’s post-IPO increase in investment, 
compared to their own pre-IPO level of investment.     
The analysis thus far is akin to an intent-to-treat analysis, defining our treatment group as all firms 
over $75 million in public float irrespective of whether or not they adopt any de-burdening provisions. A 
benefit to this approach is that it circumvents any endogeneity in the types of firms that select various 
provisions. In particular, our analysis is not subject to the concern that firms adopt more JOBS Act 
provisions when they intend to invest more aggressively. A limitation of this approach, however, is that we 
cannot isolate which de-burdening provision drives the change in investment behavior. In our next set of 
                                                          
6 The effect is also significant during the second year, although three of the four individual quarterly observations are 
not significant at conventional levels. 
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tests, we directly examine the association between JOBS Act provision adoptions and investment, with the 
understanding that the relations cannot be interpreted causally. Consistent with the JOBS Act’s de-
burdening provisions being an important driver of the increased post-IPO investment of Non-SRCs, we find 
that 93% of post-JOBS Act issuers adopt at least one of the de-burdening provisions and the adoptions of 
these provisions are associated with increased investment. Specifically, the adoption of the auditor 
attestation, say-on-pay opt-outs, or the reduced executive disclosure provision is associated with a 1.4 to 
1.8 percentage point increase in quarterly investment relative to total assets.  In contrast, we find no 
evidence of a significant relation between the pre-IPO provisions and post-IPO investment.  
Taken together, the results presented thus far are consistent with the burdens to being public 
constraining the investment of newly public firms. Several features of our analysis make alternative 
interpretations, such as reduced burdens to being public attracting firms that invest aggressively to the 
public markets, unlikely. First, the observable characteristics of firms treated with the JOBS Act’s de-
burdening provisions change similarly to the characteristics of firms in our control sample surrounding the 
passage of JOBS. Second, our findings are robust to using within-firm changes in investment behavior. 
Finally, our results are robust to using a matched sample within which pre- and post-JOBS Act issuers are 
similar on observable dimensions, including several that we do not explicitly match on. In our view, the 
totality of our findings is most consistent with the burdens to being public negatively affecting the post-
IPO investment of newly public firms.  
We next decompose our investment measure to separately analyze how the burdens to being public 
affect research and development (R&D) expenditure, which we use to proxy for innovative investment, and 
capital expenditure. Existing literature provides several channels through which the burdens to being public 
may inhibit R&D more than capital investment. First, R&D is typically more informationally sensitive, 
which Ferreira, Manso, and Silva (2012) and Aggarwal and Hsu (2013) argue generates a negative relation 
between the profitability of innovation and the level of mandated disclosure. Second, agency costs, such as 
demands to meet quarterly earnings, will more likely dissuade managers from innovative (as opposed to 
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capital) investments because their costs are recognized immediately on the income statement and their 
benefits accrue with substantial delay.7 Consistent with the above logic, we find that the effect of the JOBS 
Act’s de-burdening provisions in increasing investment is concentrated in R&D investment. For the median 
(average) firm we estimate that the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions lead to approximately $2 million 
($3 million) more in quarterly R&D expenditures. We find no statistically significant effect on capital 
expenditures. This result suggests that the burdens to being public are an economically important driver 
behind the established result that going public inhibits innovation (see e.g., Bernstein, 2015).  
If the investment decline triggered by the burdens to being public is driven by frictions, such as a 
diversion of managerial attention away from investment toward quarterly reporting or increased disclosure 
costs, then we expect relaxed burdens to not only increase investment, but also investment efficiency. To 
investigate this idea, we employ a triple differencing specification to identify whether the investment of 
firms benefitting from the de-burdening provisions becomes more positively related to market-to-book, 
which we use to proxy for investment opportunities as in Badertscher, Shroff, and White (2013). We find 
that the investment of firms treated with the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions becomes more positively 
related to the firm’s market-to-book ratio. Like the increased level of investment, this increased investment 
efficiency is concentrated in R&D, not capital, investment.  
Although our empirical setting is well suited to identify how the JOBS Act’s de-burdening 
provisions affect investment, we can only provide circumstantial evidence on the underlying mechanism. 
The concentration of the effect in R&D investment combined with the increased investment efficiency 
suggests that the information frictions and agency costs associated with the burdens to being public are one 
driver of our results. One form of this mechanism with substantial anecdotal support is the idea that the 
JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions allow for increased focus on operations as opposed to distractions 
                                                          
7 Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) argue this, stating “The pressure for quarterly results may induce a short-
term focus (Porter 1992) and the risk of being fired (Kaplan and Minton 2012) might dissuade risk-averse managers 
from innovation.” 
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from financial reporting obligations (Teach 2014).8 Consistent with this, we find that the de-burdening 
provisions are associated with a reduced propensity to just beat earnings targets and that investment is not 
sensitive to the burdens to being public for dual class firms, for which shareholder-executive conflicts are 
presumably less of a distraction. 
There are several other mechanisms through which the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions may 
increase post-IPO investment. Because R&D-intensive newly public firms are likely somewhat capital 
constrained, the compliance cost reduction triggered by the de-burdening provisions may free up capital for 
investment. Although Chaplinsky, Hanley, and Moon (2017) find little evidence that the JOBS Act affects 
direct IPO issuance costs, such as underwriter, audit, or legal fees, existing literature on SOX suggests that 
the internal and ongoing compliance costs are large and especially relevant for smaller firms.9 Financial 
Executives International (2005) puts first-year SOX compliance costs at approximately $4 million. Liazos 
(2012) further argues that the reduced executive disclosure generates meaningful cost savings for firms as 
they go public.  
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute new evidence on how 
the burdens of being public affect corporate investment. Existing literature on the topic focuses on seasoned 
firms and yields mixed results. Kraft, Vashishtha, and Venkatachalam (2017) find that the transition to 
quarterly disclosure between 1950 and 1970 results in less investment, while Pozen, Nallareddy, and 
Rajgopal (2017) find no effect of mandatory quarterly reporting on investment using a policy experiment 
in the United Kingdom between 2007 and 2014. Other studies investigate this question using the 
introduction of SOX as a policy shock to the burdens of being public. Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter (2010), 
Kang, Liu, and Qi (2010), and Gao and Zhang (2018) find that U.S. firms’ investment declines relative to 
international firms’ investment following SOX. In contrast, Albuquerque and Zhu (2018) find no effect of 
SOX on investment using a regression discontinuity design similar to that of Gao and Zhang (2018). Coates 
                                                          
8 For instance, the CFO of Malibu Boats, a post-JOBS Act EGC, noted that the JOBS Act allowed him “to focus 
more on managing the business and not have to immediately turn all your energies to 404(b).” 
9 See, e.g., Iliev (2010), Coates and Srinivasan (2014), and Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter (2010). 
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and Srinivasan (2014) summarize this literature noting that U.S. investment declines in the years predating 
SOX, but it is unclear whether it is attributable to SOX or broader changes in the U.S. environment. Indeed, 
Bradshaw (2009), Leuz and Wysocki (2016), and Hanley (2017) discuss how the multitude of regulations 
passed in the early 2000s makes it difficult to separately identify the consequences of any single legislation. 
The JOBS Act provides an opportunity to plausibly identify how the mandatory disclosure and 
governance burdens to being public affect investment within a sample of newly public firms. The unique 
disclosure and informational environment of the IPO process, combined with the aforementioned mixed 
literature examining seasoned firms, makes it hard to infer our main results from the existing literature. 
Indeed, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) argue that the richness of the disclosure environment is one reason for 
the mixed evidence regarding the economic benefits to disclosure in the U.S. Our findings both answer the 
call from recent survey papers to examine the real consequences of disclosure changes (e.g., Leuz and 
Wysocki 2016, Kanodia and Sapra 2016) and offer new insight suggesting that heavy-handed security 
regulations contribute to the lower investment and innovation levels of public firms documented in Asker 
et al. (2015) and Bernstein (2015).  
Finally, our findings are policy-relevant because they represent some of the first evidence of 
significant positive effects of the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions. Dambra, Field, and Gustafson 
(2015) find that the de-burdening provisions have little effect on whether or not firms go public, while 
Barth, Landsman, and Taylor (2017) and Chaplinsky, Hanley, and Moon (2017) all find evidence that these 
provisions increase informational asymmetry. This evidence is particularly relevant to policymakers given 
the recently passed legislation that expanded the de-burdening provisions to a larger subset of companies 
(SEC 2018).  
2. Policy Setting and Identification Strategy 
In March 2011, the IPO Task Force was commissioned to identify the most significant regulatory 
burdens and risks that small public firms face. According to the Task Force, CEOs of firms that recently 
went public responded that the biggest challenges to being public are (1) the administrative burdens of 
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public reporting, and (2) the reallocation of CEO’s time to reporting and compliance rather than building 
their company. To mitigate these challenges, the IPO Task Force recommended a series of provisions 
designed to allow newly public firms to more effectively raise capital and invest, which became the 
foundation of Title I of the JOBS Act that was passed by Congress in April of 2012. Upon the signing of 
the bill, President Obama remarked that his job was “to help our companies grow.” (Office of the Press 
Secretary 2012).  
In this paper, we examine whether the JOBS Act increased the investment of newly public firms. 
In doing so, we provide new evidence on the empirical question of how the mandatory disclosure and 
governance burdens to being public affect corporate investment and innovation.  
2.1. The JOBS Act: A regulatory shock to the burdens of being public.  
The JOBS Act streamlines the IPO process for emerging growth companies (EGCs), which are 
firms with less than $1 billion in annual revenues in the year prior to going public. Firms retain EGC status 
for five years after they go public, as long as their revenues do not exceed $1 billion, their public float does 
not exceed $700 million, and they have not issued over $1 billion in non-convertible debt within three years. 
EGC status retroactively applies to all eligible firms going public on or after December 8, 2011.  
 The first way that the JOBS Act streamlines the IPO process for EGCs is by removing some of the 
burdens of being a public firm, through what we refer to as the Act’s de-burdening provisions. It 
accomplishes this by (1) reducing disclosure requirements, (2) reducing auditing requirements, and (3) 
eliminating executive say-on-pay. The JOBS Act reduces the amount of financial and executive 
compensation information that EGCs must disclose. In terms of financial disclosure, it reduces the required 
IPO prospectus disclosure from five to two years of selected financial data and from three to two years of 
audited financial statements. This reduced disclosure persists after firms go public as firms never have to 
disclose any information prior to that disclosed in their IPO prospectus. The JOBS Act also reduces the 
amount of required executive compensation disclosure. Post-JOBS Act, EGCs must disclose compensation 
for only the past two (instead of three) years and only for the three (instead of five) highest paid executives. 
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EGCs can omit the typically required compensation, discussion, and analysis (CD&A) section, which 
includes proxy statement disclosure of the executive’s incentive structure, compensation performance 
measures, benchmarks, and related peer firm performance.10 The JOBS Act also eliminates certain auditing 
requirements, such as the auditor’s attestation to internal controls, and exempts issuers from new PCAOB 
standards.11 Finally, the JOBS Act eliminates shareholder say-on-pay votes, which can lead to suboptimal 
managerial behavior such as fixating on short-term performance or re-allocating effort to lobby their 
shareholders (Gallagher 2015, Iliev and Vitanova 2018). Together, these de-burdening provisions reduce 
many established costs to becoming a public company.  
However, the existing literature suggests that the de-burdening provisions, in particular, have little 
effect on a firm’s probability of going public (Dambra, Field, and Gustafson, 2015, Cheng, 2015) or the 
direct costs associated with going public (Chaplinsky, Hanley, and Moon, 2017). This is consistent with 
the finance literature that finds little effect of SOX on the probability that firms enter the public markets 
(Gao et al. 2013; Doidge et al. 2017). However, an important feature of the de-burdening provisions of the 
JOBS Act is that they persist for five years after the firm goes public. This contrasts with the other 
provisions of the JOBS Act, which relate only to the process of going public. Specifically, other JOBS Act 
provisions allow EGCs to confidentially file their IPO prospectus with the SEC, have analysts more 
involved IPO process (Dambra, Field, Gustafson, and Pisciotta 2018), and privately market the offering to 
qualified investors before the IPO prospectus is made public. Since the IPO prospectus is ultimately made 
public at least 21 days before a firm goes public, this is unlikely to have a persistent effect on corporate 
policy.12 However, this combination of provisions does reduce the proprietary disclosure costs to going 
public, especially for firms that ultimately withdraw their IPO, which contributed to the post-JOBS Act 
                                                          
10 Gipper (2017) finds that these CD&A disclosure force firms to allocate more capital to the CEO’s compensation. 
11 Note that this de-burdening provision is new to all EGCs. Therefore, our empirical strategy, which compares the 
effect of the JOBS Act on investment between SRC-eligible and SRC-ineligible firms (i.e. all EGCs), will not capture 
the effect of this particular provision.  
12 For instance, Dambra, Field, Gustafson, Pisciotta (2018) find that although having analysts more involved in the 
IPO process changes analyst behavior (analysts become more optimistic), this change in affiliated analyst behavior is 
short-lived (i.e., for coverage initiations) and thus unlikely to affect long-run firm outcomes. 
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increase in IPO volume (Dambra, Field, and Gustafson, 2015; Cheng, 2015). See Appendix A for a 
comprehensive summary of the of the JOBS Act’s provisions.  
2.2. Identification Strategy  
Identifying the effect of the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions is difficult, because it is hard to 
rule out the possibility that changes in market conditions or the types of firms going public contribute to 
any observed changes in investment surrounding its passage. For instance, prior literature finds a change in 
the composition of firms going and staying public over time (e.g., Gao, Ritter, and Zhu 2013; Grullon, 
Larkin, and Michaely 2018; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2017). To overcome this identification challenge, 
following Chaplinksy, Hanley, and Moon (2017), we utilize companies with below $75 million in public 
float as a control group in a difference-in-differences framework. 
Since February of 2008, firms with less than $75 million in public float have been eligible for 
Smaller Reporting Company (SRC) status.13 Specifically, since 2008, SRCs have been exempt from auditor 
rotations, auditor attestations of internal controls, and have the same options to reduce disclosure in their 
IPO prospectus and subsequent filings that EGCs are granted by the JOBS Act. However, the other aspects, 
such as increased analyst involvement, confidential IPO prospectus filings, and the ability to pre-market 
their IPO are new to SRCs after the JOBS Act.  
The idea behind our identification strategy is to compare the relative post-IPO investment of SRC 
eligible firms and Non-SRC firms before and after the passage of the JOBS Act. All of the firms in our 
sample would qualify as EGCs, were they to issue in the post-JOBS Act period (i.e., we exclude the 
approximately 13% of IPO issues with over $1 billion in pre-IPO annual revenues), but firms with greater 
than $75 million in public float, Non-SRCs, experience the largest shock surrounding the passage of the 
JOBS Act because SRCs already had access to the de-burdening provisions. Thus, the change in the relative 
post-IPO investment of SRCs and Non-SRCs following the JOBS Act plausibly identifies the effect of the 
                                                          
13 In June 2018, the SEC recently extended the eligibility of SRC status to include firms with public floats up to 
$250 million. 
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de-burdening provisions on the investment of young public firms. This identification strategy is similar to 
an intent-to-treat analysis in the sense that it circumvents any endogeneity in the selection of JOBS Act 
provisions. Equation 1 illustrates our main empirical model.  
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑞 = β1𝑁𝑜𝑛‐ 𝑆𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑞 + β2 𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛‐ 𝑆𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑞 + β3 Ln(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑞−1 +
   β4𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑞 + β5𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑞 + β6𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡)𝑖𝑞−1 + 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑞                                  (1)                                                  
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑞 is the investment in year-quarter q of firm i, measured as the sum of quarterly capital plus 
research and development expenses scaled by the firm’s beginning of quarter total assets. 𝑁𝑜𝑛‐ 𝑆𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑞 is an 
indicator for an observation with $75 million or above in public float, which in our context is an indicator 
for a firm that is treated by the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions. A firm can use its IPO proceeds (plus 
the value of shares held by non-affiliates at the time of the IPO) as their public float until the end of the first 
fiscal year in which the firm was publicly traded at the end of the second fiscal quarter.14 We follow 
Chaplinsky, Hanley, and Moon (2017) by approximating public float during this period with an indicator 
for a firm that raises $75 million or more in IPO proceeds. The logic behind this proxy is that firms raising 
over $75 million in IPO proceeds cannot be eligible for SRC status because, by definition, they have a 
public float of over $75 million.15 To compute 𝑁𝑜𝑛‐ 𝑆𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑞 for the later quarters in our sample, we hand-
collect public float information from the firm’s 10-K filing. SRC eligibility is based on the firm’s public 
float as of the end of the second fiscal quarter of the previous fiscal year.  
𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖 is an indicator variable equal to 1 when an IPO issuance date is after December 8, 2011, 
and 0 otherwise. The coefficient, β2, on the 𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛‐ 𝑆𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑞 interaction is our main coefficient 
of interest. As discussed above, a plausible interpretation of β2 is the effect of the JOBS Act’s de-burdening 
provisions on the investment of newly public firms. Industry experts emphasized that these particular 
regulatory requirements were some of the most onerous aspects of being a public firm and include reduced 
                                                          
14 https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/smrepcosysguid.pdf  
15 However, this proxy is imperfect because firms raising less than $75 million may or may not be SRCs, depending 
on how much of the firm is owned by non-affiliates.   
 12 
 
financial and executive disclosure, elimination of auditor attestations to internal controls, and elimination 
of shareholder say-on-pay. We further illustrate our identification strategy in Figure 1.     
We include several firm-quarter level control variables that are common to the investment 
literature: lagged total assets, operating cash flows, and market-to-book ratio. Because our explanatory 
variable of interest is predicated on a discrete change in public float, we also include the natural log of 
public float to ensure that 𝑁𝑜𝑛‐ 𝑆𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑞 does not capture a more general relation between IPO size and post-
IPO investment. As we discuss in detail in Section 4, the similarity of our results after adding cubic controls 
for a firm’s public float, restricting the sample to firms with under $150 million in public float, or defining 
the dependent variable as a within-firm change, further mitigates the possibility that 𝑁𝑜𝑛‐ 𝑆𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑞 captures 
a more general size effect.  
We include several sets of fixed effects to control for the fact that the type of firms going public 
changes over time.16 First, we include issue-year fixed effects, which is why we do not report the JOBS IPO 
main effect.17 This controls for any difference in the types of firms going public at any given time. We also 
include year-quarter fixed effects corresponding to the period over which investment is measured. In 
addition, we include fiscal-quarter fixed effects (i.e., Q1, Q2...etc.) and fixed effects corresponding to the 
number of quarters since the firm went public to control for any predictable patterns in corporate investment 
(see e.g., Xu and Zwick, 2018). Finally, we include Fama-French 49 industry fixed effects, with the 
additional separate biotech industry indicator as in Dambra, Field, and Gustafson (2015).  
For most of our analyses, we estimate Equation 1 over a firm’s first eight full quarters as a public 
company, clustering our standard errors at the firm and year-quarter levels to ensure that repeated 
observations within the same firm or time period do not inflate our test statistics. In three separate robustness 
                                                          
16 See, for example, Gao et al. (2013), Doidge et al. (2017), and Grullon et al. (2018).  
17 Since firms going public after December 8, 2011 benefit from the JOBS Act’s provisions, this indicator captures 
differences between firms going public in the first eleven months of 2011 compared to those going public in December. 
Although we include a JOBS IPO indicator in our estimation, we do not tabulate the coefficient because the small 
sample of firms going public in December of 2011 makes the coefficient difficult to interpret.  
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tests, we also (1) run our analyses separately by quarter to show that our main results are robust to collapsing 
the sample into one observation per firm, (2) employ a change specification where the dependent variable 
is the post-IPO change in annual investment (i.e., (post-IPO investment – pre-IPO investment) / pre-IPO 
total assets), and, in unreported tests, (3) aggregate our quarterly observations to annual observations.18  
3. Data, Sample, and Descriptive Statistics   
The sample begins with all IPOs with issuance dates between February 2, 2008, and December 31, 
2013, from SDC. The sample starts in 2008 when the SRC exemptions were extended for all issuers with 
less than $75 million in public float and ends in 2013, two full years after the effective date of the JOBS 
Act. We delete all IPOs from the banking industry (SIC 6000s), IPOs with prices less than $1 or proceeds 
$1 million, non-original IPOs, limited partnerships, closed-end funds, rights offering IPOs, firms not listing 
on the major U.S. stock exchanges (AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ) and firms lacking Compustat financial 
statement and public float data to conduct our analyses. We follow the prior literature on the JOBS Act 
(Barth et al. 2017, Chaplinsky et al. 2017) and delete those firms that are not eligible for EGC status under 
the Act (pre-IPO annual revenues greater than $1 billion). Our sample consists of 326 firms, of which 96 
are eligible for SRC status. To examine firm behavior, we include the eight quarters following the IPO for 
each issuer where the beginning of the quarter occurred after the IPO date. This results in 2,505 firm-quarter 
observations for our main analyses, although the sample is smaller for some of our supplementary analyses.  
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample, after winsorizing all variables at 
the 1% and 99% levels, as we do throughout our analyses. The average firm-quarter in our sample has total 
assets of $412.6 million, a public float of $299.2 million, and revenues of $65.7 million. Approximately 60 
percent the issuers in our sample are venture-backed and 65 percent come from tech industries. On average 
(At the median), firms invest 6% (5%) of total assets per quarter and have negative cash flows, consistent 
                                                          
18 A limitation to using this annualized approach is that we cannot measure a firm’s SRC status as precisely, since it 
is determined on a quarterly basis. 
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with studies comprising similar time periods (e.g., Gao, Ritter, and Zhu 2013). R&D expenses comprise of 
two-thirds of total investment at the mean. Our identification strategy follows that of Chaplinsky, Hanley, 
and Moon (2017) in that we compare the effects of the JOBS Act between SRC eligible and ineligible (i.e., 
Non-SRC) firms. As expected, Panel B of Table 1 shows that the Non-SRC firms are larger, more profitable, 
have larger public floats, and more revenues.  
3.2. Preliminary Evidence on Identifying Assumptions 
The differences between Non-SRC firms and control firms presented in Panel B of Table 1 do not 
compromise our identification strategy because we examine how behavior within the two groups changes 
surrounding the passage of the JOBS Act. However, there are a couple of assumptions needed in order to 
interpret β2 in Equation 1 as the effect of the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions on the investment of 
newly public firms. Perhaps the most important assumption underlying this interpretation is that the de-
burdening provisions do not cause a fundamentally different group of firms to go public. Existing literature 
suggests that this assumption is plausible. Both Dambra, Field, and Gustafson (2015) and Cheng (2015) 
find evidence that the non-de-burdening provisions of the JOBS Act, which are new both the SRCs and 
non-SRCs, affect the number and types of firms going public, but the de-burdening provisions do not.  
To provide direct evidence on whether the relative characteristics of IPO issuers with above and 
below $75 million in public float change following the JOBS Act, we run a series of descriptive firm-level 
regressions in the form of: 
𝑌 = β0 + β1 (𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 𝐼𝑃𝑂 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛‐ 𝑆𝑅𝐶) +  β2𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 𝐼𝑃𝑂 +  β3𝑁𝑜𝑛‐ 𝑆𝑅𝐶 + 𝜀                                 (2) 
where Y represents firm characteristics at the time of (or shortly following) the IPO. Table 2 
presents results to this regression for several first-order characteristics of IPO firms. Thus, β1 essentially 
captures whether the characteristics of our treated IPOs, Non-SRCs, change significantly differently than 
our untreated IPOs, SRCs, following the passage of the JOBS Act. Panel A shows that there is no significant 
change in the relative size of IPO issuers with above and below $75 million in public float following the 
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JOBS Act, measured in terms of the natural log of total assets, IPO proceeds, or revenues. Panel B presents 
results focusing on the type of firms going public. We find no evidence of a change in the relative 
probability that firms on either side of the $75 million are VC backed, high-tech, or biotech firms following 
the JOBS Act. Notably, the significantly positive JOBS IPO main effect in Column 6 of Panel B is 
consistent with the previously documented rise in biotech IPOs following the JOBS Act. Our lack of 
significance on the 𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 𝐼𝑃𝑂 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛‐ 𝑆𝑅𝐶 interaction is also consistent with Dambra, Field, and Gustafson 
(2015), who argue that the JOBS Act’s pre-IPO provisions (i.e., confidential filings and testing the waters), 
but not the de-burdening provisions, make going public more attractive for biotech firms.  
Additionally, in unreported analyses, we examine whether firms appear to manipulate their SRC 
status by adjusting their IPO proceeds. We find no evidence of any bunching in IPO proceeds around the 
$75 million threshold either before or after the passage of the JOBS Act.19 Because we do not observe non-
affiliated shares that are held prior to the IPO, which are also included in public float, we cannot definitively 
conclude whether some firms take steps to manage their SRC status. However, any float manipulation that 
does exist will not bias our approximation of SRC status because it is not occurring via manipulating IPO 
proceeds. Rather, our results will be attenuated due to measurement error in treatment status to the extent 
that firms have substantial non-affiliated shareholders prior to going public.  
3.3. Propensity Score-Matched Sample 
Despite the fact that the evidence presented in the previous section makes it unlikely that the relative 
characteristics of firms with above and below $75 million in public change surrounding the passage of the 
JOBS Act, we replicate our results with a propensity score-matched (PSM) sample. As described in Figure 
1, we match observations such that the pre- and post-JOBS Act issuers with $75 million or more in public 
float are similar in terms of industry, total assets, market-to-book ratio, operating cash flows, and public 
                                                          
19 This evidence contrasts somewhat with that in Chaplinsky, Hanley, and Moon (2017) who find that, over a longer 
pre-JOBS Act sample, there is some clustering immediately above the $75 million proceeds threshold. Not only does 
such clustering not exist in our sample, but clustering above $75 million in proceeds is not indicative of firms selecting 
into SRC status. If anything, the opposite seems to occur.  
 16 
 
floats. We conduct a similar match for firms with below $75 million in public float. As shown in Figure 1, 
we PSM match quadrant I to II and then quadrant III to quadrant IV using one-to-one matching without 
replacement and require our matches to be within the same Fama French 12 industry along with a separate 
industry specifically for biotech firms (GICS = 352010). Following prior literature, we require that the 
maximum caliper width on the PSM matched pairs to be equal to 0.20 of the standard deviation of the 
propensity scores from our logit models (Austin 2011).  
Table 3 presents differences between our treated and matched firms for both Non-SRC eligible 
(Panel A) and SRC eligible (Panel B) firms. Once we match on industry and investment determinants, we 
find no statistically significant differences pre- and post-JOBS Act for either the SRC or Non-SRC samples, 
except in the case of IPO proceeds which declines for both subgroups. Pre- and post-JOBS Act issuers are 
similar in terms of market-to-book ratio, operating cash flows, total assets, public float, the probability of 
being venture-backed, revenues, and industry. Although we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that 
SRCs and non-SRCs change along with some unobservable dimension surrounding the passage of the JOBS 
Act, these similarities between pre- and post-JOBS Act issuers within both subgroups, along dimensions 
that are not part of the matching procedure, makes such a scenario unlikely within the matched sample.  
Dambra, Field, and Gustafson (2015) find that the change in IPO volume following the JOBS Act 
was largely the result of increased biotech IPOs. Our PSM sample allows us to set the number of biotech 
issuers to be identical before and after the JOBS Act for both our SRC eligible and SRC ineligible samples. 
This, along with the evidence in Table 2 that the percentage of SRC and Non-SRC issuers that are in the 
biotech increased similarly following the JOBS Act, provides further assurance that any observed change 
in post-IPO investment is unlikely to be driven by a fundamental increase in biotech firms.  
4. Main Results 
 In this section, we use the identification strategy in Section 3 to examine whether the amount that 
newly public firms invest depends on the public disclosure and governance requirements identified as 
particularly onerous by the IPO Task Force. This empirical strategy uses SRC firms (i.e., those with less 
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than $75 million in public float), which are exposed to market conditions and all non-de-burdening aspects 
of JOBS, in a quasi-difference-in-differences framework. As we discuss in Section 3.2, the interaction 
between JOBS IPO and Non-SRC plausibly isolates the effect of the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions 
(i.e., scaled financial and executive disclosure, auditor attestations, and say-on-pay votes) on investment.  
 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 present the baseline results of this difference-in-differences analysis, 
with Column 2 excluding all control variables except for year and industry fixed effects. In both cases, the 
JOBS IPO × Non-SRC interaction is 0.027 and statistically significant. The similarity in coefficients 
between Columns 2 and 3 shows that our findings are not sensitive to the set of control variables or fixed 
effect structure used throughout the analysis. Unreported tests also show that our findings are similar when 
aggregating the analysis to the annual level, measuring all flow variables over the trailing twelve months.20 
 In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, we take two steps to further mitigate the possibility that our findings 
are due to a change in the relative characteristics of the types of firms going public with less $75 million in 
public float, compared to larger firms. In Column 3, we minimize the variation in public floats by restricting 
the sample to firms with less than $150 million in public float. This reduces our sample by approximately 
60% but leaves just over 500 firm-quarters on either side of the $75 million threshold. In this specification, 
we also exclude issuers with between $70 and $80 million in public float, to mitigate measurement error 
and the possibility that some issuers select to be on either side of the $75 million public float threshold (e.g., 
Gao, Wu, and Zimmerman 2009). The fact that the JOBS IPO × Non-SRC interaction remains highly 
significant and similar in magnitude to the estimates in Columns 1 and 2 mitigates the potential concern 
that the Non-SRC indicator captures some non-linearity in the relation between public float and post-IPO 
investment. Unreported tests further alleviate this possibility as the JOBS IPO × Non-SRC coefficient is 
virtually unchanged after adding in cubic controls for a firm’s public float.  
                                                          
20 These annualized results hold whether we include one observation per firm during their first year following the IPO 
or two observations per firm, one for each of the first two years after their IPO. We view the quarterly specification 
as preferable because it allows us to more precisely define our control variables, including SRC status. 
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In Column 4, we restrict the sample to our PSM observations, in which the observable 
characteristics of firms with above and below $75 million in public float do not change following the 
passage of the JOBS Act. Again, we continue to find a highly significant JOBS IPO × Non-SRC interaction 
that is similar in magnitude to the estimates in Columns 1‒3. The similarity of the pre- and post-JOBS Act 
issuers within this matched sample make it unlikely that differences between pre- and post-JOBS Act 
issuers are a primary driver of our findings.  
 Figure 2 decomposes the pre- and post-JOBS Act by year and plots the estimates for Year × Non-
SRC interactions coefficients generated from specifications similar to those in Columns 2‒4 of Table 4, 
except that we replace the JOBS IPO indicator with a year indicator for the calendar year in which IPO 
occurred. We vary the calendar year of the Year indicator in separate regressions across the time series of 
our IPO sample. The figure shows that the relative post-IPO investment of newly public firms with less 
than and greater than $75 million in public float is persistent within either the pre- or post-JOBS Act period, 
but very different across the two periods. In the pre-JOBS Act period, firms with $75 million or more in 
public float invested less than smaller firms, while in the post-JOBS Act period, they invest more. This 
takeaway is similar using the full, float <$150 million, or matched samples. The evidence in this figure is 
important because it suggests that there was no trend in the relative investment of firms with less than or 
greater than $75 million in public float prior to the JOBS Act. Rather, there appears to be a structural break 
in this relation following its passage, when firms with $75 million and over in public float first benefitted 
from the Act’s de-burdening provisions.  
We next examine the timing of this investment increase relative to the firm’s IPO date. The solid 
line in Figure 3 presents coefficient estimates for the JOBS IPO × Non-SRC interaction for a specification 
that is identical to that in Column 2 of Table 4, except that the sample is restricted to one observation per 
firm and the regressions are conducted separately for each quarter following the IPO. Thus, we conduct 
eight separate regressions. The x-axis indicates how many quarters following the IPO each sample occurs, 
and we report the interaction coefficient for each of these post-IPO quarter samples. The figure illustrates 
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that the positive JOBS IPO × Non-SRC interaction is most statistically significant in the first year following 
the IPO, however, there is not a clear decline in the point estimates during the following year. In addition, 
this quarterly decomposition demonstrates that the statistical significance of the post-JOBS Act increase in 
investment does not rely on having multiple observations per firm. For instance, the estimates generated 
for quarters 1 through 4 are highly statistically significant with approximately 300 IPO issuers in each 
sample.   
Overall, our evidence thus far suggests that the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions have an 
economically large effect on the post-IPO investment of newly public firms. Non-SRC quarterly investment 
increases by two to three percentage points per quarter relative to SRCs following the passage of the JOBS 
Act, which corresponds to between $4 million and $5 million dollars for the median IPO issuer. Relative 
to the standard deviation of post-IPO quarterly investment, which is 5% of assets, this represents an 
approximately 0.5 standard deviation increase in post-IPO investment. The economically significant 
positive relation between the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions and corporate investment that we 
estimate is consistent with evidence in Kang et al. (2010), which finds that the burdens introduced by SOX 
resulted in firms raising their discount rate on investments from under 10% to over 15% with the increasing 
being largest for small firms. In Section 5, we discuss the magnitude of our findings in more depth, along 
with analyses that decompose investment into its components and a discussion of the potential mechanisms 
through which the de-burdening provisions may impact investment. 
4.1. Within-firm Analysis   
As a robustness test, we conduct a within-firm analysis where the dependent variable is an issuer’s 
post-IPO change in investment, defined as the difference between post-IPO annual investment and pre-IPO 
annual investment scaled by pre-IPO total assets. We do not deploy this within-firm analysis for our main 
specification because firms go public to raise capital for investment (e.g., Ang and Brau, 2006; Lowry et 
al. 2017), leading to drastic changes in investment level in the years surrounding firms’ IPOs. In our sample, 
the average firm increases investment by 100% of their pre-IPO assets in the year following their IPO 
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(compared to pre-IPO levels) even after winsorizing the post-IPO change in investment at the 1% and 99% 
levels. The 99 percentile firm increases investment by 16 times their pre-IPO assets, while the 90th percentile 
increases by just over 3 times their pre-IPO assets. Given the substantial variation, we aggressively 
winsorize post-IPO change in investment at the 10% and 90% levels, although results are similar 
winsorizing at the 1% and 99% levels. 
The empirical specification we use to examine the effect of the JOBS Act’s de-burdening 
provisions on the post-IPO change in investment is similar to that described in Equation 1, with a few 
important differences. First, the dependent variable is the change in investment relative to pre-IPO 
investment scaled by pre-IPO assets (
Investmentt or t+1−InvestmentPre‐IPO
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑃𝑟𝑒‐𝐼𝑃𝑂
) and the sample includes 
observations for the first two years after a firm goes public. Thus, the sample includes up to two 
observations per firm and we include an indicator variable to capture in which of the two years the 
observation occurs. Second, all control variables are measured as of the IPO date. Thus, we control for 
investment opportunities with sales growth instead of market-to-book ratios and proxy for SRC status with 
IPO proceeds, instead of the more sophisticated public float measure used throughout the rest of our 
analyses.21 Finally, we include only issue-year and industry fixed effects, since year-quarter, calendar 
quarter, and the number of quarters since the IPO fixed effects are not intuitive given our focus on annual 
changes in investment.  
Column 1 of Table 5 is similar to Column 1 of Table 4 in that we restrict the sample to Non-SRC 
issuers and exclude issue-year fixed effects. The JOBS IPO indicator is a statistically significant 0.39. This 
corresponds to non-SRCs having a 0.38 standard deviation larger change in post-IPO investment following 
the passage of the JOBS Act, which is quantitatively similar to our quarterly results in Table 4. In Columns 
2 and 3, we add SRCs to the sample and include issue-year fixed effects to ensure that this increase in post-
IPO investment is not due to changes in market conditions. The positive and significant interaction between 
                                                          
21 Results are similar defining SRC status as in our other tests. 
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JOBS Act IPOs and Non-SRCs suggests that the increase in post-IPO investment is unique to the firms 
benefitting from the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions. In unreported tests, we find similar results after 
excluding observations reporting post-IPO investment within six months of going public, mitigating the 
possibility that our post-IPO change in investment actually captures investments that occur prior to the IPO. 
These findings, combined with the evidence in Table 4, suggests that the burdens to being public restrict 
the investment of newly public firms. 
4.2. Relation between JOBS Act Provision Selections and post-IPO Investment 
Our analysis thus far has bypassed issues relating to the endogenous selection of JOBS Act 
provisions by defining treatment based on SRC eligibility, as opposed to the actual provisions that firms 
select. In this section, we examine whether the selection of the various JOBS Act provisions is associated 
with investment activity, with the understanding that this analysis does not lend itself to a causal 
interpretation. Nevertheless, if the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions are a driver of the increased post-
IPO investment of newly public firms with over $75 million in public float, then it is reasonable to expect 
a positive relation between the adoption of the de-burdening provisions and post-IPO investment. To 
examine this, we hand-collect whether the 108 post-JOBS Act EGCs in our sample select each provision. 
We follow the procedure described in Dambra, Field, and Gustafson (2015). Within our sample, we find 
that approximately 45% of post-JOBS Act EGCs adopt the auditor attestation opt-out, reduced executive 
disclosure, and reduced financial disclosure provisions. Thirty-six percent opt-out of non-binding say-on-
pay votes and 25% opt-out of future accounting standard adoptions. In sum, 93% of post-JOBS Act EGCs 
make use of at least one of the Act’s de-burdening provisions.  
 Table 6 indicates a generally positive relation between the selection of the de-burdening provisions 
and post-IPO investment. Columns 1 through 3 show that the adoption of the auditor attestation and say-
on-pay opt-outs or the reduced executive disclose provision are associated with increased investment in the 
eight quarters after a firm goes public. The magnitude of the relation is quite large. Each provision is 
 22 
 
associated with a 1.4 to 1.8 percentage point increase in quarterly investment relative to total assets.22 
Columns 4 and 5 show no evidence of a significant relation between reduced financial disclosure or opt-
outs relating to future accounting changes and post-IPO investment. 
 Taken together, the results in Tables 4 through 6 are consistent with the burdens to being public 
constraining the investment of newly public firms. Perhaps the most likely alternative interpretation is that 
reducing the burdens to being public attracts firms that intend to invest aggressively in the public markets. 
Although we cannot completely rule out this alternative contributing to our findings, several features of our 
empirical design make it unlikely to be the primary driver. Table 2 shows that the relative (observable) 
characteristics of firms with above and below $75 million in public float do not change following the JOBS 
Act. In addition, Table 5 shows that our findings persist when examining within-firm changes in investment 
behavior. Finally, our matched sample ensures that pre- and post-JOBS Act issuers are similar on 
observable dimensions, including several that we do not explicitly match on. Despite these similarities 
between the firms treated with the JOBS Act’s de-burdening and control firms, the group of firms 
benefitting from the de-burdening provisions increases post-IPO investment relative to other firms 
following the JOBS Act.  
5. Additional Tests 
 In this section, we provide additional texture to our findings in Section 4, which evidence that the 
burdens to being public inhibit the investment of newly public firms. We begin by examining the types of 
investment that are most sensitive to these burdens imposed by the JOBS Act. Next, we provide some 
evidence on whether the incremental investment facilitated by the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions 
appears to be efficient. Finally, we discuss and provide circumstantial evidence on the most likely 
mechanisms through which relaxing the burdens to being public impact corporate investment.   
                                                          
22 High correlations between the adoption of the various de-burdening provisions prevent us from isolating a single 
provision (or set of provisions) that drives this relation. Indeed, when all three of these de-burdening provisions are 
simultaneously included in the same regression their coefficients range from 0.005 to 0.008 and none are statistically 
significant. 
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5.1. Decomposing Investment 
Depending on the mechanism through which the burdens to being public affect investment, the 
effect may vary depending on the investment type. Our primary investment measure used in Section 4 
combines capital and R&D expenditures. Here, we separately examine the effect of the JOBS Act’s de-
burdening provisions on these two types of investment.  
If the de-burdening provisions are enhancing investment due to the relaxation of information or 
agency frictions, existing literature provides several reasons why one may expect the effects to be more 
significant for R&D as opposed to capital investment. First, R&D is typically more informationally 
sensitive. Ferreira, Manso, and Silva (2012) and Aggarwal and Hsu (2013) argue that this informational 
sensitivity generates a negative relation between the profitability of innovation and the level of mandated 
disclosure. Second, R&D is particularly vulnerable to demands to meet quarterly earnings, because it is a 
long-run investment for which the expenditures immediately hit the income statement. Aghion, Van 
Reenen, and Zingales (2013) summarize these ideas stating “the pressure for quarterly results may induce 
a short-term focus (Porter 1992) and the risk of being fired (Kaplan and Minton 2012) might dissuade risk-
averse managers from innovation.” 
Table 7 replicates our main results from Table 4, partitioning the dependent variable by investment 
type. Columns 1 and 2 show that the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions have no statistically significant 
effect on the capital expenditures of newly public firms. This null result is similar using the full sample 
(column 1), the propensity score matched sample (column 2), or a sample that restricts the sample to firms 
with below $150 million in public float (unreported).  
In columns 3 and 4, we examine the effect of the de-burdening provisions on R&D expenditures. 
We find that non-SRCs increase their post-IPO R&D expenditure relative to SRCs following the passage 
of JOBS. In our full sample specification in Column 3, the point estimate of 0.022 suggests that non-SRCs 
increase R&D relative to lagged assets by 2.2 percentage points. Columns 4 and 5 yield similar estimates 
after restricting the sample to propensity score matched observations and firms that conduct some level of 
 24 
 
R&D, respectively. Within the R&D sample used in Column 5, the standard deviation in quarterly R&D 
expenditures is 5% so the coefficient estimate of 0.018 represents an approximate 0.36 standard deviation 
increase in R&D expenditures.  
The evidence in this section suggests that the burdens to being public are an economically important 
driver behind the established result that going public inhibits innovation (see e.g., Bernstein, 2015). The 
fact that the effect of the de-burdening provisions in concentrated in R&D as opposed to capital investments 
supports the possibility that the reason the burdens to being public affect investment is because they 
exacerbate information and agency frictions. However, these findings do little to rule out other alternatives.  
5.2. The Burdens to being Public and Investment Efficiency 
 If the investment decline triggered by the burdens to being public is driven by frictions, such as a 
diversion of managerial attention away from investment toward quarterly reporting or increased disclosure 
costs, then we expect relaxed burdens to not only increase investment, but also increase investment 
efficiency. In contrast, we would expect investment efficiency to decline as firms are de-burdened if the 
investment increase we observe is due to a weakening of internal controls, which lead to overinvestment 
(Jensen 1986, Cheng, Dhaliwal, and Zhang 2013, Dambra 2018).23 
We begin by examining how investment efficiency changes for benefactors of the de-burdening 
provisions of the JOBS Act. We interact our empirical proxy for investment opportunities, MTB, with our 
indicator variables, JOBS IPO and Non-SRC.24 Specifically, we estimate the following empirical model: 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑞 = β1𝑁𝑜𝑛‐ 𝑆𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑞 + β2 (𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖 × 𝑁𝑜𝑛‐ 𝑆𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑞) + β3(𝐽𝑂𝐵𝑆 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖 ×
𝑁𝑜𝑛‐ 𝑆𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑞 × 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑞) + ∑ 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝜷 + 𝐹𝐸𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖𝑞                                                   (3) 
                                                          
23 To the extent that the de-burdening provisions impair managers’ information sets, this can also lead to 
overinvestment problems (e.g., McNichols and Stubben 2008).   
24 This empirical design follows the format as in Badertscher, Shroff, and White (2013) and Bloom, Bond, and 
Reenan (2007). Sales growth is another common proxy for an investment opportunity set, but leads to extreme 
observations (reduces our sample) since many IPO firms have very small (no) revenue. 
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The coefficient on β3 captures how the sensitivity of investment to investment opportunities differentially 
changes following the JOBS Act for firms that are treated by the de-burdening provisions. To the extent 
that fewer burdens allow managers to more freely pursue positive NPV projects, we expect β3 to be positive. 
However, to the extent that the de-burdening provisions result in overinvestment, we expect a negative 
coefficient on β3. Similar to equation 1, we control for firm size, public float, cash flows, and our full 
complement of fixed effects. In addition, we control for all of the double interactions between Non-SRC, 
JOBS IPO, and MTB.  
 Our regression results for equation 3 are presented in Table 8. We find for both our full sample 
results in Column 1 and our PSM results in Column 3 that the coefficient on the triple interaction is positive 
and statistically significant. Column 2 also shows that the coefficient is of similar magnitude after restricting 
the sample to firms with below $150 million in public float, although the effect is statistically insignificant 
at conventional levels, with a t-statistic of 1.61.  
In Columns 4 through 6, we replicate the analysis using R&D expenditure as the dependent 
variable. Across all three columns the JOBS IPO × Non-SRC × MTB triple interaction is positive and 
statistically significant, with t-statistics ranging from 1.90 to 2.61. In unreported tests, we find no such 
significant relations when using capital expenditures as the dependent variable. These findings suggest that 
not only do the de-burdening provisions increase post-IPO R&D, but they also enhance R&D efficiency. 
Again, these findings are consistent with increased informational or agency frictions being one reason that 
the burdens to being public deter innovative investment among newly public firms.  
5.3. Other Potential Mechanisms 
Although our empirical setting is well suited to identify how the JOBS Act’s de-burdening 
provisions affect investment, we can only provide circumstantial evidence on the underlying mechanism. 
Perhaps the most direct explanation is that, by lowering the costs associated with being public, firms will 
have more money available to invest. Iliev (2010) estimates that the auditor attestation component of SOX, 
which the JOBS Act relaxes, increases direct audit fees by approximately $700,000 per year. Survey 
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evidence in Financial Executives International (2005), puts the first year SOX compliance costs at 
approximately $4 million, after factoring in internal and external labor costs. Ken Moch, CEO of Chimerix, 
a successful post-JOBS Act EGC, noted that without the SOX opt-out, “biotech companies would be 
transferring hard-earned cash from research and clinical development to compliance” (Herper 2013). 
However, the direct compliance costs associated with relaxing the burdens put in place by SOX seems 
unlikely to explain the entire investment decline we observe.  
The manner in which the JOBS Act reduces the burdens to being public extends beyond the 
relaxation of compliance requirements put in place by SOX. Liazos (2012) discusses the costs associated 
with the executive disclosure requirements relaxed by the JOBS Act, which he argues are significant 
because executive contracts were not established by a compensation committee and are therefore 
challenging and time-consuming to rationalize ex-post. Iliev and Vitanova (2018) discuss the potential for 
the say-on-executive pay vote, which is not required for post-JOBS Act EGCs, to divert managerial 
attention from investment toward shareholder lobbying. Not only is the labor associated with burdens 
costly, but to the extent that it occupies the CEOs time, it may have the unintended consequence of 
distracting the CEO from investment activities. Indeed, according to a survey conducted by the IPO Task 
Force (2011), one of the biggest challenges to being a public company is the reallocation of CEOs time to 
reporting and compliance rather than building their company. 
The evidence in Section 5.1. that the de-burdening provisions affect R&D, but not capital, 
expenditures coupled with the increased investment efficiency is consistent with the burdens to being public 
making managers more fixated on quarterly numbers as opposed to long-term investment. Relative to 
capital expenditures, R&D expenditures hit the income statement more quickly and the benefits to R&D 
are more long-run. Thus, managers focused on immediate earnings can benefit from foregoing R&D (see 
e.g., Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Baber, Fairfield, Haggard, 1991; Bushee, 1998; Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and 
Wong, 2003).  
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To provide direct evidence on this mechanism, we next examine the extent that the JOBS Act’s de-
burdening provisions mitigate managers’ distraction with earnings expectations. For this analysis we use 
the same difference-in-differences regression from Equation 1 with MOB Ind., defined as an indicator 
variable equal to 1 when a firm meets or beats by $0.01 the consensus analyst EPS forecast for the quarter, 
and 0 otherwise, as the dependent variable.25  We intend for this proxy to capture the propensity of managers 
to fixate on achieving an earnings target through managing earnings, cutting positive NPV projects, or 
modifying analyst expectations, rather than focusing on efficient value-enhancing investment.    
Column 1 of Table 9 reports our results on how the JOBS Act affected the propensity of firms to 
meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on Non-SRC 
indicates that prior to the passage of the JOBS Act, Non-SRCs were more likely than SRCs to just meet or 
beat an analysts’ earnings forecast. The negative and significant JOBS IPO × Non-SRC interaction indicates 
that this is no longer the case after the passage of the JOBS Act (coeff. = -0.171, p-value < 0.01). Thus, we 
find that the propensity to just meet or beat analyst expectations decreases by an economically significant 
17.1% after the implementation of the JOBS Act. Similar to our previous tables, our results are qualitatively 
similar when we restrict the sample to a public float less than $150 million in Column 2 and when we limit 
our sample to our PSM matched observations in Column 3.   
In our final analyses we more broadly examine whether managerial preoccupation with shareholder 
demands is a likely driver of the post-JOBS Act increase in post-IPO investment. Theory suggests that 
managerial distraction can be induced via increased pressure from the public firm’s shareholders. For 
example, Stein (1988; 1989) and Fishman and Hagerty (1989) argue that the managers of public firms may 
be distracted with short-term incentives to boost earnings (even at the expense of long-term performance) 
to appease investors. Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) Fisman, Khurana, Rhodes-Kropf, and Yim (2013), 
                                                          
25 Note that we deploy a linear regression model even though MOB Ind. is binary in order to include our full 
complement of fixed effects into our regression model and to avoid an incidental parameters problem (Greene 2004).  
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and Edmans, Heinle, and Huang (2016) further argue that reforms empowering shareholders or increasing 
mandatory disclosure or governance requirements can exacerbate these types of agency problems.  
To investigate this idea, we test whether the effect of the burdens to being public on investment 
depends on whether the issuing firm has dual-class shares. This test is motivated by the idea that if 
managerial distraction via public reporting and governance mandates leads to our findings, then we expect 
the effect of de-burdening provisions to be less significant for firms with dual-class shares because their 
CEOs have less incentive to cater to shareholder demands. To examine this, we augment our main analysis 
by interacting the JOBS IPO × Non-SRC interaction with Dual, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the issuing 
firm has multiple classes of shares and 0 otherwise, according to data provided on Jay Ritter’s website, and 
used in Loughran and Ritter (2004). Similar to our previous specification we report the total investment 
results in columns 1 to 3, followed by our R&D only results in columns 4 to 6. The JOBS IPO × Non-SRC 
interaction remains positively significant as in our previous analyses, but the JOBS IPO × Non-SRC × Dual 
triple interaction is negative across the columns and statistically significant in columns 3, 5, and 6, offsetting 
the effect of the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions on investment for firms with multiple share classes. 
Unreported tests reveal no significant triple interaction using capital expenditures as the dependent variable. 
Taken together, these findings provide some evidence that that the JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions do 
not appear to have a significant effect on the investment policy of dual-class firms, for which presumable 
shareholder-executive interactions are less of a distraction for CEOs.   
Overall, our evidence suggests that a likely contributor to the negative relation between the burdens 
to being public and post-IPO investment is that the reporting requirements and governance mandates 
imposed on public firms make managers more preoccupied with non-investment activities. However, 
determining how much of the post-IPO investment increase is due to reduced managerial distraction 
compared to, for example, reduced compliance costs or other channels (see e.g., Kang, Liu, and Qi, 2010), 
is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we explore how mandatory disclosure and governance mandates affect the investment 
of newly public firms. To do so, we conduct a policy experiment surrounding the JOBS Act, which reduces 
mandated financial and executive disclosure, auditing requirements, and shareholder say-on-pay for a 
subset of newly public firms.  
We find that newly public firms that are treated with these reduced burdens to being public increase 
both the level and efficiency of post-IPO investment relative to a control sample already privy to such 
exemptions. This investment reduction is concentrated in innovative investments. Existing literature offers 
many potential explanations for this negative relation between the burdens to being public and post-IPO 
investment. The magnitude of the post-IPO investment decline makes it unlikely that it is entirely explained 
by compliance costs crowding out investment. An important driver of the investment decline appears to be 
that the burdens to being public divert managerial focus to non-investment activities, such as catering to 
quarterly benchmarks.  
Our findings should be of interest to policy-makers as the SEC considers further regulatory changes 
to stimulate the investment and innovation of public firms. In particular, existing evidence suggests that the 
JOBS Act’s de-burdening provisions increases informational asymmetry for newly public firms, but does 
little to increase the attractiveness of going public (e.g., Dambra et al. 2015, Barth et al. 2017, Chaplinsky 
et al. 2017). We document increased investment and investment efficiency as two important longer-run 
benefits to these provisions. Our results are particularly timely given the recent expansion of the de-
burdening provisions to firms with public floats of up to $250 million (SEC 2018). An intriguing avenue 
for future research is to determine the specific de-burdening provisions that are most responsible for these 
benefits. 
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Appendix A 
JOBS Act provisions under the “IPO on-ramp” for Emerging Growth Companies (EGCs)  
 
 Pre-JOBS Act Post-JOBS Act available to EGCs Post-JOBS Act available to SRCs 
PRE-IPO PROVISIONS:  
Confidential filing No confidential filing for U.S. issuers. Emerging growth companies (EGCs) may 
submit draft IPO registration statements to 
the SEC for confidential review (to go 
public, registration statements and any 
amendments must be publicly filed with 
SEC no later than 21 days before the road 
show). 
New provision under the JOBS Act. 
Testing-the-waters Written and oral communications 
regarding the offering prior to filing the 
registration statement is generally 
prohibited. During offering, written 
communications other than prospectus 
generally prohibited. 
EGCs, either before or after filing a 
registration statement, may test-the-waters 
by engaging in oral or written 
communications with Qualified 
Institutional Buyers and individual 
accredited investors to determine interest 
in an offering. 
New provision under the JOBS Act. 
Analyst IPO Involvement  Research reports by offering 
participants in connection with the 
offering may be considered 
prospectuses and offers for purposes of 
Section 12 liability and Section 5 “gun 
jumping” restrictions of the Securities 
Act of 1933. 
 Research reports and public 
appearances by managers and co-
managers are prohibited by FINRA 
rules for up to 40 days after the date of 
the offering and within 15 days before 
or after the expiration of lock-up 
provisions, subject to certain 
exceptions. 
 FINRA rules include extensive 
restrictions on the ability of research 
 Research reports by offering 
participants in connection with offerings 
for common equity securities are not 
considered prospectuses or offers for 
purposes of Section 12 liability and 
Section 5 “gun jumping” restrictions of 
the Securities Act of 1933. 
 FINRA rules prohibiting publication of 
research reports and public appearances 
do not apply to those by offering 
participants following the IPO or prior 
to the expiration of lock-up provisions. 
 SEC and FINRA rules may not restrict 
investment bankers from arranging for 
communications between research 
analysts and potential investors or 
research analysts from participating in 
communications with management in 
New provision under the JOBS Act. 
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analysts and investment bankers to 
interact. 
the presence of investment bankers; 
rules are otherwise unaffected. 
DE-BURDENING PROVISIONS (providing scaled disclosure and opt-outs of previous or future regulations):  
Reduced financial 
statement disclosure 
 Three years of audited financial 
statements in IPO 
registration statement. 
 Five years of selected financial data in 
IPO registration statement, subsequent 
registration statements and periodic 
reports. 
 Two years of audited financial 
statements in IPO registration statement. 
 Two years of selected financial data in 
IPO registration statement. Selected 
financial data in subsequent registration 
statements limited to earlier audited 
period presented in IPO registration 
statement. 
Available to SRCs under Regulation 
S-K. 
Reduced compensation 
disclosure 
Compensation, discussion and analysis 
section and compensation disclosure for 
five named executive officers in IPO 
registration statement and 
subsequent annual reports. 
No compensation, discussion and analysis 
section. Compensation disclosure for three 
named executive officers in IPO 
registration statement and subsequent 
annual reports. 
Available to SRCs under Regulation 
S-K. 
Auditor attestation opt-out Management assessment and auditor 
attestation of internal control over 
financial reporting beginning with second 
10-K following IPO. 
Only management assessment of internal 
control over financial reporting beginning 
with second 10-K following IPO. 
Available to SRCs under Regulation 
S-K. 
Future GAAP accounting or 
PCAOB auditing standards 
opt-out 
Must comply with applicable new or 
revised financial accounting standards. 
Not required to comply with any new or 
revised financial accounting or auditing 
standards (cannot selectively comply). 
New provision under the JOBS Act. 
Executive compensation vote 
opt-outs 
Must hold non-binding advisory 
shareholder votes on executive  
compensation (specifically, Say-on-Pay, 
Say-on-Frequency, or Say-on-Golden 
Parachute vote required by the 
Dodd-Frank Act and SEC rules). 
Exempt from holding non-binding 
advisory shareholder votes on executive 
compensation (specifically, Say-on-Pay, 
Say-on-Frequency, or Say-on-Golden 
Parachute vote). 
SRCs were exempted from Say-on-
Pay through January 21, 2013.  
Derived from Goodwin Procter LLP publication: “JOBS ACT: A New IPO Playing Field for Emerging Growth Companies” and Dambra, Field, and Gustafson (2015). 
http://www.goodwinprocter.com/Publications/Newsletters/Client-Alert/2012/~/media/E7463DA9940544CF83D8715CC1E67A98.pdf 
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Appendix B 
Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Definition (source) 
Investment The sum of quarterly capital expenditures and research development scaled by 
lagged quarterly assets (Compustat).  
Capital Expenditure Quarterly capital expenditures scaled by lagged quarterly assets (Compustat).  
R&D Expenditure Quarterly research development scaled by lagged quarterly assets (Compustat).  
JOBS IPO An indicator variable equal to 1 if an issuer’s IPO date occurs after December 8, 
2011, and 0 otherwise. 
Market-to-Book The market value of equity + book assets – stockholders’ equity scaled by book 
assets (Compustat). 
Op. Cash Flow Quarterly cash flows from operations scaled by lagged quarterly assets 
(Compustat). 
Ln(Proceeds) The natural log of IPO proceeds (SDC). 
Non-SRC An indicator variable equal to 1 if the issuer is eligible for small reporting 
company (SRC) status under SEC regulations and 0 otherwise. The regulations 
required that an SRC have a public float of less than $75 million. Following 
Chaplinsky, Hanley, and Moon (2017), we use the company’s IPO proceeds to 
calculate an issuer’s public float for the firm-quarters immediately following an 
IPO. We use IPO proceeds until the issuer publicly issues a 10-Q for their 
second fiscal quarter, which determines EGC for the following year, consistent 
with SEC regulation. For the quarters following the year in which a firm first 
publicly disclosed their second fiscal year float, we hand collect the public float 
from firms’ annual reports (SDC, hand collection). 
Lag Ln(Float) The natural log of an issuers’ float as determined above (SDC, hand collection). 
Ln(Assets) The natural log of the firm’s lagged quarterly assets (Compustat). 
MOB Ind. An indicator variable equal to 1 if an issuer’s actual EPS either exactly meets 
the consensus analyst forecast or beats analyst consensus EPS by $0.01, and 0 
otherwise. We restrict the analyst consensus to be no more than 30 days 
following the end of the quarter (I/B/E/S Summary). 
Venture IPO An indicator variable equal to 1 when the issuer is owned by a venture capitalist 
firm at the time of the IPO, and 0 otherwise (SDC). 
Hi-Tech IPO An indicator variable equal to 1 when an issuer is classified as a high-tech firm, 
and 0 otherwise (SDC). 
Biotech IPO An indicator variable equal to 1 when an issuer has a Global Industry Standard 
(GICS) code equal to 352010 “Biotechnology”, and 0 otherwise (Compustat). 
Ln(Revenue) The natural log of 1+ the firm’s quarterly revenues (Compustat).  
Dual  An indicator variable equal to 1 if an IPO issuer has multiple classes of shares, 
and 0 otherwise (Jay Ritter’s webpage). 
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Figure 1: Identification Strategy 
This figure provides an illustration of our identification strategy. Firm quarters are categorized by their 
public float and their IPO date. We restrict our sample to the first full eight quarters following the IPO for 
issuers with revenues of less than $1 billion. If their public float is less than $75 million, then the firm is 
eligible for smaller reporting company (SRC) status. Following Chaplinsky et al. (2017), we use the 
company’s IPO proceeds to calculate an issuer’s public float for the firm-quarters immediately following 
an IPO. We use IPO proceeds until the issuer publicly issues a 10-Q for their second fiscal quarter, which 
determines EGC for the following year. For the quarters following the year in which a firm first publicly 
disclosed their second fiscal year float, we hand-collect the public float from firms’ annual reports. 
Throughout our sample (i.e. pre- and post-JOBS Act), SRCs are exempted from the de-burdening provisions 
of the JOBS Act. If an observation has a public float ≥ $75 million (i.e., Non-SRC = 1), they only receive 
exemptions from the de-burdening provisions after the JOBS Act. Thus, our treated group in our difference-
in-difference specification is the set of IPOs after the JOBS Act with floats ≥ $75 million. Similar to 
Chaplinsky et al. (2017), we conduct two separate propensity score matches (PSMs) matching Post-JOBS 
Act observations to Pre-JOBS Act observations with similar SRC eligibility. Specifically, we are matching 
post-JOBS Non-SRC observations to pre-JOBS Non-SRCs observations moving across the top row 
(quadrant I to quadrant II).  We conduct a similar match with SRC observations in the bottom row (quadrant 
III to quadrant IV). To assign propensity scores, we run a logit with JOBS IPO as the dependent variable 
and investment determinants as independent variables (Lag Ln(Assets), Op. Cash Flow, MTB, and Lag 
Ln(Float)) for SRCs and Non-SRCs separately. We use 1-to-1 matching without replacement using calipers. 
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Figure 2: Parallel Trend Analysis  
Each line presents coefficient estimates for Non-SRC (i.e., an indicator variable for over $75 million in 
public float) interacted with indicators for each year, where the dependent variable is investment, defined 
as quarterly capital plus research and development expenditures scaled by beginning of quarter assets. The 
solid line uses the full sample and a specification identical to that in Column 3 of Table 4, except that we 
remove the JOBS IPO indicator and interact Non-SRC with indicators for each calendar year. We group 
years 2008 and 2009 because of the small sample of IPO issuers during this period. The long dashed lines 
represent the coefficient estimates from our propensity scored matched regression. The short dash lines 
represent the coefficient estimate from our model whereby we restrict our sample to those firms with public 
floats less than $150 million.  
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Figure 3: JOBS IPO × Non-SRC Coefficient by Quarter since IPO 
This solid line presents coefficient estimates for the JOBS IPO × Non-SRC interaction, where the dependent 
variable is investment, defined as quarterly capital plus research and development expenditures scaled by 
beginning of quarter assets. The specification is identical to that in Column 3 of Table 4, except that our 
regression samples are restricted to one observation per firm grouped by the post-IPO quarter when each 
observation occurred. Thus, we run eight separate regressions. The x-axis plots the interaction coefficients 
for each quarter sample following the IPO. The sample sizes for each quarterly regression range from 315 
in quarter one to 284 in quarter eight. The dashed line presents 90% confidence intervals on estimated 
coefficient.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in our subsequent empirical analysis. Panel B 
provides a descriptive comparison of firm characteristics between Non-SRC eligible (i.e. Float ≥ $75M) 
and control (i.e. Float < $75M) firms. For continuous (discrete) variables, *, **, and *** correspond to 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using difference in means tests 
(Fischer’s Exact Tests). See Appendix B for variable definitions.  
Panel A: Full Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Q1 Mean Median Q3 σ 
Investment 2,505  0.02 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.05 
Capital Expenditure 2,505  0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 
R&D Expenditure 2,505  0.00 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05 
JOBS IPO 2,505  0.00 0.53 1.00 1.00 0.50 
Non-SRC 2,505  1.00 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.41 
Lag Assets 2,505  113.07 412.60 198.84 469.47 542.75 
Op. Cash Flow 2,505  -0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.08 
Market-to-book 2,505  1.72 3.51 2.73 4.34 2.55 
Float 2,505  85.00 299.20 161.49 346.45 409.91 
IPO Proceeds 2,505  70.00 144.55 104.65 178.60 130.38 
Revenues 2,505  9.55 65.74 39.32 90.09 78.27 
Venture IPO 2,505  0.00 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.49 
Hi-Tech IPO 2,505  0.00 0.65 1.00 1.00 0.48 
Biotech IPO 2,505  0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.37 
MOB 2,440  0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.36 
Dual 2,505 0 0.1 0 0 0.3 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics Partitioned by Non-SRC and Control Status 
 Control  Non-SRC   
Variable N Mean  N Mean Difference  
Investment 527 0.07  1,978 0.05 -0.02 *** 
Capital Expenditure 527 0.01  1,978 0.02 0.01 *** 
R&D Expenditure 527 0.06  1,978 0.03 -0.03 *** 
JOBS IPO 527 0.54  1,978 0.53 -0.01  
Lag Assets 527 109.48  1,978 493.36 383.88 *** 
Op. Cash Flow 527 -0.07  1,978 0 0.07 *** 
Market-to-book 527 3.03  1,978 3.63 0.6 *** 
Float 527 45.28  1,978 366.86 321.58 *** 
IPO Proceeds 527 47.65  1,978 170.37 122.72 *** 
Revenues 527 23.08  1,978 77.11 54.03 *** 
Venture IPO 527 0.59  1,978 0.6 0.01  
Hi-Tech IPO 527 0.74  1,978 0.63 -0.11 *** 
Biotech IPO 527 0.27  1,978 0.14 -0.13 *** 
MOB 469 0.1  1,971 0.16 0.06 *** 
Dual 527 0.11  1,978 0.10 0.30  
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Table 2: Relative Characteristics of Non-SRC and Control Issuers Surrounding JOBS 
This table presents estimates from regressions of IPO issuer characteristics on an indicator for a firm that 
is Non-SRC (i.e., has $75 million or greater in public float), an indicator for a JOBS Act IPO (i.e., after 
December 8, 2011) and their interaction. No control variables or fixed effects are included in the regression. 
The dependent variables are listed at the top of each column and are defined in Appendix B. T-statistics, 
computed using standard errors that are clustered at the firm and year-quarter levels, are presented in 
parentheses below the coefficient. *, **, and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Size of IPO Issuers 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Ln(Proceeds) Ln(Assets) Ln(Revenue) 
JOBS IPO × Non-SRC -0.097 
(-0.70) 
-0.166 
(-0.78) 
-0.053 
(-0.14) 
JOBS IPO -0.080 
(-0.70) 
-0.084 
(-0.48) 
-0.315 
(-0.98) 
Non-SRC 1.354*** 
(13.57) 
1.466*** 
(9.51) 
1.756*** 
(6.53) 
Constant 3.811*** 
(48.63) 
4.275*** 
(34.34) 
2.006*** 
(8.34) 
Adj. R-squared 0.507 0.333 0.237 
# SRC Pre(Post)-JOBS 43 (53) 43 (53) 43 (53) 
# Non-SRC Pre(Post)-JOBS 109 (121) 109 (121) 109 (121) 
# Observations 326 326 326 
 
Panel B: Type of IPO Issuers 
 
 (4) (5) (6) 
 Venture IPO Hi-tech IPO Biotech IPO 
JOBS IPO × Non-SRC 0.038 
(0.32) 
0.026 
(0.24) 
-0.037 
(-0.38) 
JOBS IPO 0.032 
(0.33) 
0.025 
(0.29) 
0.191** 
(2.13) 
Non-SRC -0.087 
(-0.98) 
-0.199** 
(-2.47) 
-0.159** 
(-2.57) 
Constant 0.628*** 
(8.47) 
0.767*** 
(11.84) 
0.186*** 
(3.12) 
Adj. R-squared -0.001 0.025 0.093 
# SRC Pre(Post)-JOBS 43 (53) 43 (53) 43 (53) 
# Non-SRC Pre(Post)-JOBS 109 (121) 109 (121) 109 (121) 
# Observations 326 326 326 
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Table 3: Propensity Score-Matched Descriptive Statistic Comparison 
This table provides descriptive statistics comparing the average differences in SRC eligible and SRC 
ineligible firm-quarters before and after the JOBS Act. Following Chaplinsky et al. (2017), we conduct two 
separate propensity score matches (PSM) for SRC-eligible and -ineligible firms. Our PSM characteristics 
are the independent variables in equation 1 (Op. Cash Flow, Market-to-Book, Lag Ln(Assets), and Lag 
Ln(Float)) and the dependent variable is JOBS IPO. We use one-to-one PSM matching and require our 
matches to be within the same Fama French 12 industry along with a separate industry specifically for 
biotech firms (GICS = 352010). Following the prior literature, we require that the maximum caliper width 
on the PSM matched pairs to be equal to 0.20 of the standard deviation of the propensity scores from our 
logit models (Austin 2011). Panel A (B) provides the comparison of descriptive statistics for SRC ineligible 
(eligible) firms. The definitions of the below variables are provided in Appendix B. For continuous 
(discrete) variables, *, **, and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively, using difference in means tests (Fischer’s Exact Tests).  
Panel A: Non-SRC Comparison 
 JOBS IPO = 0  JOBS IPO = 1  
Variable N Mean σ  N Mean σ  
MTB 639 3.598 2.718  639 3.496 2.281  
Op. Cash Flow 639 0.007 0.07  639 0.006 0.061  
Lag Ln(Assets) 639 5.738 1.025  639 5.788 0.901  
Lag Ln(Float) 639 5.538 0.84  639 5.541 0.825  
Venture IPO 639 0.579 0.494  639 0.592 0.492  
Biotech IPO 639 0.063 0.242  639 0.063 0.242  
Lag Ln(Revenues) 639 3.876 1.323  639 3.934 1.268  
Ln(IPO Proceeds) 639 5.01 0.673  639 4.885 0.563 *** 
Hi-Tech IPO 639 0.643 0.479  639 0.617 0.487  
Dual Class 639 0.089 0.285  639 0.108 0.311  
Panel B: SRC Eligible Comparison 
  JOBS IPO = 0   JOBS IPO = 1  
Variable N Mean σ  N Mean σ  
MTB 135 3.145 2.844  135 2.983 2.064  
Op. Cash Flow 135 -0.074 0.108  135 -0.074 0.093  
Lag Ln(Assets) 135 4.278 1.06  135 4.155 0.891  
Lag Ln(Float) 135 3.714 0.552  135 3.718 0.512  
Venture IPO 135 0.607 0.49  135 0.689 0.465  
Biotech IPO 135 0.311 0.465  135 0.311 0.465  
Lag Ln(Revenues) 135 1.959 1.647  135 1.68 1.601  
Ln(IPO Proceeds) 135 3.775 0.659  135 3.626 0.66 * 
Hi-Tech IPO 135 0.756 0.431  135 0.793 0.407  
Dual Class 135 0.089 0.286  135 0.104 0.306  
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Table 4: Post-IPO Investment and the Burdens to being Public 
This table regresses quarterly investment, defined as quarterly capital plus research and development 
expenditures scaled by beginning of quarter assets, on JOBS IPO × Non-SRC where JOBS IPO indicates a 
firm going public after December 8, 2011, and Non-SRC indicates a firm with greater than or equal to $75 
million in public float. The sample contains up to eight observations per firm corresponding to the first 
eight full quarters that the firm is public. In all columns, we control for Fama-French 49 industry fixed 
effects plus a 50th separate biotech indicator. In all columns except for Column 1, we control for the natural 
log of lagged total assets and public float, contemporaneous market-to-book and operating cash flows, year-
quarter fixed effects, and fixed effects for the firm’s fiscal quarter and the number of quarters since the IPO. 
We also control for issue-year fixed effects so we suppress the coefficient estimates on the JOBS IPO 
indicator. See Appendix B for detailed variable definitions. T-statistics, computed using standard errors that 
are clustered at the firm and year-quarter levels, are presented in parentheses below the coefficient. *, **, 
and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 Full Sample Full Sample Float < $150M PSM Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Quarterly Investment 
JOBS IPO × Non-SRC 0.027*** 
(2.96) 
0.027*** 
(3.40) 
0.024** 
(2.53) 
0.028*** 
(2.82) 
Non-SRC -0.016** 
(-2.26) 
-0.012* 
(-1.98) 
-0.007 
(-0.64) 
-0.010 
(-1.40) 
Lag Ln(Assets)  
 
-0.011*** 
(-4.07) 
-0.007* 
(-1.72) 
-0.013*** 
(-5.15) 
Op. Cash Flow  
 
-0.153*** 
(-4.86) 
-0.195*** 
(-4.98) 
-0.152*** 
(-3.52) 
MTB  
 
0.002*** 
(2.86) 
0.004*** 
(3.91) 
0.002** 
(2.28) 
Lag Ln(Float)  
 
0.008*** 
(3.05) 
0.004 
(0.49) 
0.007** 
(2.54) 
Issue Year FEs YES YES YES YES 
FF49 + Biotech FEs YES YES YES YES 
Year-Quarter FEs NO YES YES YES 
Fiscal Quarter FEs NO YES YES YES 
Quarter since IPO FEs NO YES YES YES 
Adj. R-squared 0.363 0.442 0.491 0.500 
# SRC Pre(Post)-JOBS 240 (287) 240 (287) 217 (250) 135 (135) 
# Non-SRC Pre(Post)-JOBS 936 (1,042) 936 (1,042) 264 (339) 639 (639) 
# Observations 2,505 2,505 1,070 1,548 
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Table 5: Within Firm Post-IPO Investment Change and the Burdens to being Public  
This table regresses the post-IPO change in investment, defined as the difference between post-IPO annual 
capital plus research and development expenditures and the same sum prior to the IPO all scaled by pre-
IPO assets, on JOBS IPO × Proceeds ≥ 75 where JOBS IPO indicates a firm going public after December 
8, 2011, and Proceeds ≥ 75 indicates a firm with IPO proceeds greater than or equal to $75 million in public 
float. The sample contains up to two observations per firm corresponding to the first two years following 
the IPO. In Column 1, the sample is restricted to Non-SRCs. All Columns except for Column 1 control for 
issue year fixed effects (so we suppress the coefficient on JOBS IPO). All columns include Fama-French 
49 industry fixed effects plus a 50th separate biotech indicator, a control for pre-IPO investment (defined as 
capex plus R&D divided by total assets), and fixed effects for an indicator for whether a firm is in its first 
or second year after the IPO. In Columns 1 and 3 we also include the natural log of pre-IPO total assets, 
pre-IPO operating cash flows, sales growth, and the natural log of IPO proceeds as independent variables. 
T-statistics, computed using standard errors that are clustered at the firm level, are presented in parentheses 
below the coefficient. *, **, and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
 Non-SRC Full Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Post-IPO Change in Annual Investment 
JOBS IPO × Proceeds ≥ 75  
 
0.608*** 
(2.89) 
0.514*** 
(2.81) 
JOBS IPO 0.387*** 
(2.94) 
  
Proceeds ≥ 75  
 
0.175 
(1.25) 
-0.099 
(-0.59) 
Pre-IPO Investment 0.061 
(0.07) 
 
 
-0.069 
(-0.17) 
Pre-IPO Ln(Assets) -0.494*** 
(-6.66) 
 
 
-0.431*** 
(-7.98) 
Pre-IPO Op. Cash Flow -0.232 
(-1.19) 
 
 
-0.248 
(-1.64) 
Pre-IPO Sales Growth -0.018 
(-0.62) 
 
 
0.002 
(0.09) 
Lag Ln(Float) 0.742*** 
(4.50) 
 
 
0.630*** 
(5.46) 
Issue Year FEs NO YES YES 
FF49 + Biotech FEs YES YES YES 
Years since IPO FEs YES YES YES 
Adj. R-squared 0.410 0.200 0.397 
# Proceeds ≥ 75 Pre(Post)-JOBS 194 (196) 194 (196) 194 (196) 
# Proceeds < 75 Pre(Post)-JOBS 0 (0) 63 (71) 63 (71) 
# Observations 390 524 524 
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Table 6: Post-IPO Investment and De-burdening Provision Selection 
This table regresses investment, defined as quarterly capital plus research and development expenditures 
scaled by beginning of quarter assets, on indicator variables for whether a firm selected the various de-
burdening provisions of the JOBS Act. Thus, the sample is restricted to firms filing to go public after the 
passage of the JOBS Act (i.e., JOBS IPOs). The sample contains up to eight observations per firm 
corresponding to the first eight full quarters that the firm is public. We control for the natural log of lagged 
total assets and public float as well as contemporaneous market-to-book and operating cash flows. See 
Appendix B for detailed variable definitions. We control for year-quarter fixed effects, issue year fixed 
effects, Fama-French 49 industry fixed effects plus a 50th separate biotech indicator, and fixed effects for 
the firm’s fiscal quarter and the number of quarters since the IPO. T-statistics, computed using standard 
errors that are clustered at the firm and year-quarter levels, are presented in parentheses below the 
coefficient. *, **, and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Quarterly Investment 
Attestation Opt-out 0.014** 
(2.47) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Less Exec. Disclosure  
 
0.017*** 
(3.33) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Say-on-Pay Opt-out  
 
 
 
0.018*** 
(3.22) 
 
 
 
 
Less Fin. Disclosure  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.011 
(-1.56) 
 
 
Accounting Opt-out  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.001 
(0.12) 
Lag Ln(Assets) -0.008 
(-1.21) 
-0.010 
(-1.61) 
-0.009 
(-1.44) 
-0.009 
(-1.38) 
-0.008 
(-1.28) 
Op. Cash Flow -0.135** 
(-2.83) 
-0.134** 
(-2.86) 
-0.130** 
(-2.85) 
-0.156** 
(-2.99) 
-0.147** 
(-2.91) 
MTB 0.002** 
(2.53) 
0.002* 
(2.11) 
0.002* 
(1.92) 
0.002* 
(2.05) 
0.002** 
(2.41) 
Lag Ln(Float) 0.011*** 
(3.17) 
0.012*** 
(3.22) 
0.012*** 
(3.14) 
0.011** 
(2.90) 
0.012*** 
(3.52) 
Issue Year FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-Quarter FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
FF49 + Biotech FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
Fiscal Quarter FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter since IPO FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R-squared 0.388 0.397 0.399 0.391 0.370 
# Observations 830 830 830 762 830 
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Table 7: Decomposing Investment into R&D and Capital Expenditures 
In Columns 1 and 2 this table regresses quarterly capital expenditures, defined as quarterly capital 
expenditures scaled by beginning of quarter assets, on JOBS IPO × Non-SRC where JOBS IPO indicates a 
firm going public after December 8, 2011, and Non-SRC indicates a firm with greater than or equal to $75 
million in public float. In Columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is quarterly R&D expenditures, defined 
as quarterly R&D expenditures scaled by beginning of quarter assets. The sample contains up to eight 
observations per firm corresponding to the first eight full quarters that the firm is public. In all columns, we 
control for Fama-French 49 industry fixed effects plus a 50th separate biotech indicator. In all columns, we 
control for the natural log of lagged total assets and public float, contemporaneous market-to-book and 
operating cash flows, year-quarter fixed effects, and fixed effects for the firm’s fiscal quarter and the 
number of quarters since the IPO. We also control for issue-year fixed effects so we suppress the coefficient 
estimates on the JOBS IPO indicator. Columns 2 and 4 restrict the sample to our propensity score matched 
observations, while column 5 restricts the sample to firms with non-zero R&D expenditures. See Appendix 
B for detailed variable definitions. T-statistics, computed using standard errors that are clustered at the firm 
and year-quarter levels, are presented in parentheses below the coefficient. *, **, and *** correspond to 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 Full Sample PSM Sample Full Sample PSM Sample R&D Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Capital Expenditure R&D Expenditure 
JOBS IPO × Non-SRC 0.004 
(1.07) 
0.000 
(0.06) 
0.022*** 
(3.10) 
0.026*** 
(2.81) 
0.018** 
(2.20) 
Non-SRC -0.002 
(-0.61) 
0.001 
(0.34) 
-0.009 
(-1.52) 
-0.010 
(-1.51) 
-0.007 
(-0.91) 
Lag Ln(Assets) -0.002 
(-0.94) 
-0.002 
(-1.29) 
-0.010*** 
(-5.68) 
-0.010*** 
(-5.49) 
-0.013*** 
(-6.25) 
Op. Cash Flow 0.035** 
(2.59) 
0.036** 
(2.20) 
-0.181*** 
(-6.74) 
-0.178*** 
(-4.45) 
-0.208*** 
(-6.35) 
MTB 0.000 
(1.31) 
0.001 
(1.68) 
0.002*** 
(2.81) 
0.001* 
(1.95) 
0.002*** 
(3.12) 
Lag Ln(Float) 0.004** 
(2.09) 
0.003* 
(1.83) 
0.004** 
(2.29) 
0.003** 
(2.10) 
0.005* 
(1.90) 
Issue Year FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
FF49 + Biotech FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-Quarter FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
Fiscal Quarter FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter since IPO FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R-squared 0.409 0.447 0.630 0.659 0.561 
# SRC Pre(Post)-JOBS 240 (287) 135 (135) 240 (287) 135 (135) 187 (238) 
# Non-SRC Pre(Post)-JOBS 936 (1,042) 639 (639) 936 (1,042) 639 (639) 592 (749) 
# Observations 2,505 1,548 2,505 1,548 1,764 
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Table 8: Post-IPO Change in Investment Sensitivity 
In Columns 1 through 3, this table regresses quarterly investment, defined as quarterly capital plus research and development expenditures scaled 
by beginning of quarter assets, on JOBS IPO × Non-SRC × MTB, where JOBS IPO indicates a firm going public after December 8, 2011, and Non-
SRC indicates an observation with greater than or equal to $75 million in public float. In Columns 4 through 6 the dependent variable is quarterly 
R&D, defined as quarterly research and development expenditures scaled by beginning of quarter assets. The sample contains up to eight 
observations per firm corresponding to the first eight full quarters that the firm is public. We control for the natural log of lagged total assets and 
public float as well as operating cash flows and all double interactions. See Appendix B for detailed variable definitions. We control for year-quarter 
fixed effects, Fama-French 49 industry fixed effects plus a 50th separate biotech indicator, and fixed effects for the firm’s fiscal quarter and the 
number of quarters since the IPO. We also include issue year fixed effects so we suppress the coefficient estimates on the JOBS IPO indicator. T-
statistics, computed using standard errors that are clustered at the firm and year-quarter levels, are presented in parentheses below the coefficient. *, 
**, and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Full Sample < $150 
Million 
PSM Sample Full Sample < $150 
Million 
PSM Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Quarterly Investment Quarterly R&D 
JOBS IPO × Non-SRC × MTB 0.005* 
(1.73) 
0.005 
(1.61) 
0.008** 
(2.67) 
0.005** 
(2.15) 
0.005* 
(1.90) 
0.007** 
(2.61) 
Non-SRC× MTB -0.006** 
(-2.28) 
-0.004 
(-1.30) 
-0.006*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.005** 
(-2.59) 
-0.004 
(-1.66) 
-0.006*** 
(-3.48) 
Non-SRC 0.006 
(0.63) 
0.003 
(0.24) 
0.008 
(0.91) 
0.008 
(1.06) 
0.005 
(0.41) 
0.008 
(1.09) 
JOBS IPO × Non-SRC 0.012 
(0.94) 
0.007 
(0.46) 
0.004 
(0.30) 
0.004 
(0.47) 
0.005 
(0.47) 
0.004 
(0.36) 
MTB 0.007*** 
(3.18) 
0.007*** 
(3.08) 
0.008*** 
(5.15) 
0.006*** 
(2.98) 
0.005*** 
(2.84) 
0.007*** 
(4.88) 
JOBS IPO × MTB -0.005* 
(-1.96) 
-0.004* 
(-1.72) 
-0.008*** 
(-3.53) 
-0.004 
(-1.67) 
-0.004* 
(-1.81) 
-0.006** 
(-2.61) 
Lag Ln(Assets) -0.011*** 
(-4.01) 
-0.007* 
(-1.71) 
-0.013*** 
(-5.16) 
-0.010*** 
(-5.77) 
-0.010*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.011*** 
(-5.66) 
Op. Cash Flow -0.145*** 
(-4.57) 
-0.191*** 
(-4.73) 
-0.136*** 
(-3.10) 
-0.172*** 
(-6.29) 
-0.198*** 
(-5.64) 
-0.160*** 
(-3.85) 
Lag Ln(Float) 0.008*** 
(3.42) 
0.005 
(0.68) 
0.008*** 
(2.90) 
0.004*** 
(2.75) 
0.006 
(1.07) 
0.004** 
(2.72) 
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Issue Year FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-Quarter FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FF49 + Biotech FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fiscal Quarter FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter since IPO FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R-squared 0.447 0.493 0.508 0.634 0.626 0.667 
# SRC Pre(Post)-JOBS 240 (287) 217 (250) 135 (135) 240 (287) 217 (250) 135 (135) 
# Non-SRC Pre(Post)-JOBS 936 (1,042) 264 (339) 639 (639) 936 (1,042) 264 (339) 639 (639) 
# Observations 2,505 1,070 1,548 2,505 1,070 1,548 
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Table 9: Post-IPO Change in Quarterly Managerial Short-termism 
This table regresses an empirical proxy for managerial short-termism on JOBS IPO × Non-SRC where JOBS 
IPO indicates a firm going public after December 8, 2011, and Non-SRC indicates a firm with greater than 
$75 or equal to million in public float. To be included in the sample the firm-quarter observation must have 
analyst coverage in I/B/E/S. We control for the natural log of lagged total assets and public float as well as 
contemporaneous market-to-book and operating cash flows. We control for year-quarter fixed effects, 
Fama-French 49 industry fixed effects plus a 50th separate biotech indicator, and fixed effects for the firm’s 
fiscal quarter and the number of quarters since the IPO. We also include issue year fixed effects so we 
suppress the coefficient estimates on the JOBS IPO indicator. Our dependent variable is MOB Ind., an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if an issuer’s actual EPS either exactly meets the quarterly consensus analyst 
forecast, or beats average analyst consensus EPS by $0.01. See Appendix B for detailed variable definitions. 
T-statistics computed using standard errors that are clustered at the firm and year-quarter levels are 
presented in parentheses below the coefficient. *, **, and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Full Sample < $150 Million PSM Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Quarterly MOB Indicator 
JOBS IPO × Non-SRC -0.170*** 
(-4.27) 
-0.177*** 
(-4.63) 
-0.133** 
(-2.74) 
Non-SRC 0.118*** 
(3.00) 
0.174*** 
(3.17) 
0.101** 
(2.27) 
Lag Ln(Assets) -0.036* 
(-2.03) 
-0.031 
(-1.24) 
-0.052** 
(-2.54) 
Op. Cash Flow 0.319** 
(2.34) 
0.575** 
(2.58) 
0.401** 
(2.16) 
MTB -0.003 
(-0.99) 
-0.001 
(-0.18) 
-0.010 
(-1.25) 
Lag Ln(Float) 0.018 
(0.80) 
-0.045 
(-0.85) 
0.046* 
(1.97) 
Issue Year FEs YES YES YES 
Year-Quarter FEs YES YES YES 
FF49 + Biotech FEs YES YES YES 
Fiscal Quarter FEs YES YES YES 
Quarter since IPO FEs YES YES YES 
Adj. R-squared 0.081 0.088 0.069 
# SRC Pre(Post)-JOBS 220 (249) 197 (213) 121 (125) 
# Non-SRC Pre(Post)-JOBS 933 (1,038) 264 (338) 637 (636) 
# Observations 2,440 1,012 1,519 
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Table 10: Dual-Class IPOs and the effect of the Burdens to being Public on Investment 
In Columns 1 through 3, this table regresses quarterly investment, defined as quarterly capital plus research and development expenditures scaled 
by beginning of quarter assets, on JOBS IPO × Non-SRC × Dual, where JOBS IPO indicates a firm going public after December 8, 2011, and Non-
SRC indicates an observation with greater than or equal to $75 million in public float, and Dual is an indicator for an IPO with dual class shares. In 
Columns 4 through 6 the dependent variable is quarterly R&D, defined as quarterly research and development expenditures scaled by beginning of 
quarter assets. The sample contains up to eight observations per firm corresponding to the first eight full quarters that the firm is public. We control 
for the natural log of lagged total assets and public float as well as operating cash flows and all double interactions. See Appendix B for detailed 
variable definitions. We control for year-quarter fixed effects, Fama-French 49 industry fixed effects plus a 50th separate biotech indicator, and fixed 
effects for the firm’s fiscal quarter and the number of quarters since the IPO. We also include issue year fixed effects so we suppress the coefficient 
estimates on the JOBS IPO indicator. T-statistics, computed using standard errors that are clustered at the firm and year-quarter levels, are presented 
in parentheses below the coefficient. *, **, and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Full Sample < $150 
Million 
PSM Sample Full Sample < $150 
Million 
PSM Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Quarterly Investment Quarterly R&D 
JOBS IPO × Non-SRC × Dual -0.044 
(-1.27) 
-0.027 
(-0.75) 
-0.074*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.020 
(-1.29) 
-0.030* 
(-1.71) 
-0.041** 
(-2.66) 
Non-SRC× Dual 0.076*** 
(4.10) 
0.038* 
(1.85) 
0.082*** 
(4.08) 
0.043*** 
(3.63) 
0.041*** 
(3.03) 
0.053*** 
(4.18) 
Non-SRC -0.013** 
(-2.23) 
-0.005 
(-0.48) 
-0.013* 
(-1.76) 
-0.009 
(-1.63) 
-0.005 
(-0.47) 
-0.012* 
(-1.71) 
JOBS IPO × Non-SRC 0.027*** 
(3.53) 
0.022** 
(2.36) 
0.031*** 
(3.08) 
0.021*** 
(2.85) 
0.021** 
(2.43) 
0.027*** 
(2.84) 
Dual -0.056*** 
(-4.24) 
-0.057*** 
(-4.38) 
-0.060*** 
(-4.35) 
-0.038*** 
(-3.91) 
-0.048*** 
(-4.20) 
-0.045*** 
(-4.45) 
JOBS IPO × Dual 0.017 
(0.53) 
0.039 
(1.33) 
0.045** 
(2.28) 
0.014 
(0.99) 
0.039*** 
(2.77) 
0.034** 
(2.54) 
Lag Ln(Assets) -0.012*** 
(-4.58) 
-0.008* 
(-1.82) 
-0.014*** 
(-5.64) 
-0.010*** 
(-6.13) 
-0.010*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.011*** 
(-5.86) 
Op. Cash Flow -0.145*** 
(-4.57) 
-0.191*** 
(-4.69) 
-0.146*** 
(-3.37) 
-0.177*** 
(-6.53) 
-0.200*** 
(-5.69) 
-0.175*** 
(-4.34) 
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MTB 0.002** 
(2.72) 
0.004*** 
(3.96) 
0.002** 
(2.18) 
0.002*** 
(2.77) 
0.003*** 
(3.01) 
0.001* 
(1.85) 
Lag Ln(Float) 0.007*** 
(2.87) 
0.002 
(0.24) 
0.006** 
(2.64) 
0.003** 
(2.10) 
0.004 
(0.58) 
0.003** 
(2.27) 
Issue Year FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year-Quarter FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FF49 + Biotech FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fiscal Quarter FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Quarter since IPO FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R-squared 0.453 0.494 0.509 0.633 0.624 0.662 
# SRC Pre(Post)-JOBS 240 (287) 217 (250) 135 (135) 240 (287) 217 (250) 135 (135) 
# Non-SRC Pre(Post)-JOBS 936 (1,042) 264 (339) 639 (639) 936 (1,042) 264 (339) 639 (639) 
# Observations 2,505 1,070 1,548 2,505 1,070 1,548 
 
